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Throughout the world, the rail industry historically has been one of the most extensively regulated
sectors in the economy.'  Price, entry, exit, financial structure, accounting methods, vertical relations and
operating rules have all been subject to some form of governmental control.  The application of the public
utility  paradigm of governmental  regulation has  been expressly  premised on the  assumption  that the
economic characteristics of the rail industry preclude competitive organization and any need for market
responsiveness.
Over the past three decades, however, economists and policy makers have become increasingly
critical of the traditional public utility regulation of the rail industry. 2 It is generally understood that in
the relevant economic markets in which rail carriers seek to meet demand, there is often (but surely not
always) effective competition.  It is generally agreed that governmental restrictions upon the structure and
conduct of firms in this industry impose considerable costs upon society.  Misallocation of freight traffic
among  competing  transport modes,  excess  capacity, excessive  operating  costs,  and  poor  investment
decisions are often the result of misguided regulatory policies.  Regulatory controls have, therefore, been
held responsible in large part for the poor financial condition of the railroads, for the deterioration of the
rail plant, for the suppression and delay of cost-reducing innovations, and for the mediocre quality of rail
service.
The purpose of this paper is to suggest a set of principles for restructuring railroad regulation, and
indeed for  restructuring  the orientation  of railroad entities,  for  the sake  of the  public  interest.  Our
methodology is to first focus on the economic characteristics of the rail industry and their implications
for the design of efficient regulatory policy. Then, we apply powerful sets of analytic tools, in the context
of the industry characteristics, to clarify the relevant principles for reform.  One of the main points that
emerges from the application of industrial organization analysis is that much can be learned about actual
and potential  industry structure and  performance, and about policies  designed to promote  the  public
interest, from pertinent understanding of market demands for the industry's products and the nature of the
productive techniques available to the industry's firms.  Indeed, before we can fully assess the implications
of policies aimed at rate regulation or infrastructure investments, it is essential to have a full understanding
of the nature of technology, costs, and demand facing the rail industry.  The role of the government in
relation  to  market  behavior  should,  therefore,  be  explicitly  based  on  the  underlying  economic
characteristics of the industry and the technological conditions of its production.
See Friedlaender  (1969) and Keeler (1983).
2  See among others: Friedlaender  (1971);  Levin (1978, 1981);  and Beyer (1987).- 2 -
We hope to impart the following message in the course of this chapter: recent developments in
industrial organization  analysis as well as in regulatory practice call for a major reorientation of public
policy towards railroads, one that follows a set of principles we shall articulate.
2.  CURRENT  ISSUES  OF PUBLIC  POLICY  IN THE RAIL  INDUSTRY3
The  economic  characteristics  of  the  rail  industry  make  it  a  natural  target  for  government
intervention, yet also render it particularly difficult to regulate in the public interest.  The old regulatory
systems  failed  to  handle  the central  regulatory  problem  arising  in railroads  and  certain  other  major
industries (e.g., telecommunications, electric power, and postal services): the mixture of competition and
monopoly elements in supply.  Indeed, in these industries, just  as in the railroad industry over the years,
regulation has  stifled competition  in the provision of services, restricted the benefits of economies  of
scope, retarded innovation, fostered inefficient service, and thereby harmed the public interest, while at
the same time protecting it from the exploitation of monopoly power.  The first-best lesson of the perfect
competition model, calling for prices to be set equal to marginal costs, has no doubt contributed to the
common regulatory ethos which seeks to equate price to some measure of cost.  This doctrine has been
used frequently where it is completely inappropriate and without logical foundation, that is, in cases where
prices should be based on demand as well as cost considerations.
This section focuses on the central pricing issues involved in partial deregulation of railroad rates.
It  articulates  principles  to  guide  regulatory  oversight  of  the  rate  setting  of  unsubsidized
railroads--principles that are consistent with economic analysis and that are essential for protection of the
public interest. Public interest regulatory oversight of railroad pricing involves two basic issues.  The first
of these is the adequacy of revenues, the determination of the criteria by which this can be judged,  and
the means by which it can be achieved.  The second issue is the choice of rates that are consistent with
adequate revenues and that are best for the public interest.
In a  regime  of deregulation, one  of the  key elements in  protecting the public  interest is the
avoidance of any residual regulation which effectively prevents the achievement of financial viability by
the rail network.  The public will hardly be well served by a set of regulatory rules which condemn the
railroads to an inability to compete in the financial marketplace and which, consequently, will result in
a rail network which is increasingly obsolete, is characterized by deterioration, and in which cumulative
abandonment of service becomes the guiding principle.
3  It is a pleasure  and an honor for the authors to acknowledge  their debt to the thinking  and written testimony  of
William  J. Baumol  on many of the subjects  covered  in this portion  of the paper. A partial summary  of this material
can be found in Willig and Baumol  (1987).- 3 -
In determining prices for the outputs of multiproduct railroad firms, regulators have long faced
a number of difficult issues that flow inexorably from the basic economic characteristics of the industry
that we discussed above.  The endemic economies of scale and scope imply that straightforward measures
of costs cannot be used to dictate pricing.  Economies of scale imply that marginal cost pricing, absent
subsidy to the firm or multipart tariffs, will not allow the firm to break even.  Further, the shared costs
that are a concomitant of economies of scope cannot be unambiguously identified with individual products,
so that any rule selected to associate shared costs with individual services will be arbitrary.  Such arbitrary
measures as fully distributed (or "fully allocated") costs, therefore, cannot substitute for  marginal cost
measures as decision rules for proper pricing, and the search for any purely cost-based substitute rule is
a remnant of inappropriate reliance on the model of perfect competition for guidance on regulation.
A system of rate regulation based upon fully distributed costs, where costs are apportioned on any
basis other than demand, is inappropriate because prices set by that method are highly unlikely to permit
railroads to achieve an adequate rate of return.  Moreover, such a method leads to serious inefficiency by
discouraging  innovation and by generating prices that are too high to attract competitive traffic, which
severely restrict the amount of services delivered by railroads, and which thus produce still higher rates
for the remaining traffic.4
By  contrast,  there  are  sound  pricing  principles  which  promote  economic  efficiency  while
simultaneously removing impediments to adequate returns for carriers.  These principles can be applied
in practically useful  fashions  to assess the reasonableness  of those rates  which  are judged  to require
continued regulatory oversight. 5 The principles lead to demand differentiated prices, sometimes referred
to as Ramsey prices, which apportion all unattributable fixed and common costs of the railroad among its
services on  the basis of the  values of those services to consumers, mathematically expressed  as their
elasticities of demand.  By providing that each service is priced at a markup over marginal costs which
is inversely related to the elasticity of demand for that service, economically efficient differential pricing
combines cost  and demand  factors in an optimal manner.  These principles result in lower  prices for
shippers generally by establishing a set of rates which encourages the purchase of more rail transportation
services by  more shippers than artificial fully distributed cost based  pricing, thereby creating  a  larger
traffic  base  over  which  unattributable  costs  can  be  apportioned.  Ramsey  pricing  maximizes  the
opportunity for rail carriers to earn an adequate rate of return on capital, and they foster innovation and
efficiency  in  the  provision  of  rail  transportation  services  by  rewarding  carriers  who  achieve  cost
reductions.
4  See Braeutigam  (1977), Kahn  (1988).
See Braeutigam  (1979, 1984).- 4 -
Economically efficient differential pricing is entirely consistent with the hallmark of deregulation:
that market forces, rather than regulation, should control rates for transportation services.  Thus, when a
particular type of traffic is subject to competition, direct or indirect, regulatory intervention is unjustified
because that competition will produce efficient prices without regulatory guidance.  Furthermore, so long
as a railroad's earnings fall short of its cost of capital, the need for regulatory constraints upon any of that
carrier's  rates  is minimal  and, to  the extent  such a constraint prevents  the carrier  from earning  an
adequate return in the future, it is contrary to the public interest.  By definition, there is no danger that
such a carrier is receiving excessive overall profits derived from market power or any other cause.  In
addition, if the rate for any service supplied by a railroad not yet earning adequate revenues overall is held
down by regulation below that level which consumers of that service are prepared to pay rather than do
without the service, then, in the long run, even those consumers will be harmed--the carrier will find it
unprofitable to invest the necessary replacement and maintenance capital, causing a deterioration in, and
ultimate withdrawal of, the service.
2.1  The Proper Criterion for  Adequacy  of Revenues
Since avoiding impairment of financial viability plays so crucial a role in any rational program
of rate regulation, it is important to describe the criterion by which financial viability can be judged.  Just
what information is required to determine when a firm's revenues are adequate to cover its pertinent costs?
While the answer would appear to be obvious, the past history of regulation demonstrates rather forcefully
that it is in fact widely misunderstood.  The basic issue is that among the costs  which must always be
included in these  calculations is the cost of the firm's  capital, including any capital  it has  generated
internally.
The logic of this criterion is straightforward.  Revenues are defined to be adequate when they are
just sufficient to enable the firm to attract the capital needed for maintenance, replacement, mcdernization
and whatever expansion demand conditions justify.  If revenues are lower than this, the deterioration and
eventual disappearance of the service in question are a foregone conclusion.
Adequate revenues are those which provide a rate of return on net investment equal to the current
cost of capital (i.e., the level of return available on alternative investments).  This is the revenue level
necessary for a railroad to compete equally with other firms for available financing in order to maintain,
replace, modernize, and, where appropriate, expand its facilities and services.  If railroads cannot earn the
fair market rate of return, their ability both to retain existing investments and obtain new capital will be
impaired, because both the existing and prospective funds could be invested elsewhere at a more attractive
rate of return.  Indeed, the market for funds is one of the most competitive  in the economy.  It simply- 5 -
offers no room to those who cannot meet the competition for funds by others  who come there  to seek
capital.  Thus, there is no escaping the following principles that determine the adequacy of revenues:
(a)  The firm's  overall rate of return must be equal to the returns currently earned  by the
typical firm with similar risks elsewhere in the economy.  Otherwise the required funds
will be denied to it.
(b)  This means that adequacy of revenues can only be judged  by comparison with earnings
outside the regulated industry, not by comparing the regulated  industry's earnings with
the market value of its equity.  For the market prices of those securities will automatically
adjust themselves downward to match any act by the regulator which restricts the earnings
of a firm below a compensatory rate of return, and so such a comparison will appear to
justify  any earnings restrictions, no matter how inappropriate.
(c)  In determining the revenue requirements for financial viability, the rate of return obtained
by  comparison with other  industries must be applied to a  rate base which  covers the
economic replacement cost (under regulation) of all facilities. (Suitably updated historic
costs  may  be utilized instead of replacement costs  if the allowed  rate is expressed  in
nominal terms).
(d)  With the rate base determined in this way and the rate of return on that rate base equal
to the cost of capital, as given by earnings prevailing elsewhere in the economy, one will
have determined the figure for total net earnings by the railroad that can appropriately be
considered to be adequate for it to compete successfully in the capital market.
(e)  This earning figure must not be applied as a rigid ceiling.  Otherwise railroads will not
have the ability to earn this figure over the long run, since they will be precluded from
making  up  for  the  revenue  shortfalls  which  may  occur  as  the  result  of  temporary
downward fluctuations in demand for their services.
For prices to make sense economically they must be never be incompatible with this earnings
level.  Of course,  no  prices can  guarantee that a  railroad will earn  adequate returns  overall.  For if
demands for its services are insufficient or the railroads' operations are conducted wastefully or its services
are poor, even appropriate prices cannot be expected to lead to profitable operation.  But once the railroads
are permitted to charge appropriate prices in a competitive environment, the regulatory impediments to
financial viability will have been cleared away.  It is then up to the railroads to take advantage of the
opportunity by means of economy of operation, quality of service and effective marketing effort.-6  -
2.2  The Regulatory Problem
Indivisibilities, pervasive economies of scale and scope, high costs of entry, and small-numbers
competition in the railroad industry are all consistent with the likely persistence of prices in excess of
marginal cost.  However, while scale economies go hand-in-hand with natural monopoly, a railroad may
or may not have the price-setting discretion that characterizes the textbook monopolist.  It all depends on
whether the activities characterized by economies of scale and scope are shielded from other sources of
competition in the relevant market, and whether there are protective barriers to entry.
In the railroad industry, extensive capital sums must be sunk in way and structures and in a variety
of ancillary facilities in order to create new rail lines.  The sunk cost and longevity of railroad capital may
suggest that the railroad industry is one in which contestability analysis cannot conceivably apply--these
sunk costs generally  suffice to deter entry by new rail  lines.  However, railroad services are far more
contestable than these impediments to rail entry would suggest, because there are often strong competitive
pressures from other modes of transportation--such as trucking and water carriage--on the rates charged
for shipment of a wide variety of commodities. 6
The basic patterns of railroad regulation, established many decades ago in wholly different market
conditions,  are  simply  obsolete.  Their  premise  was  that  railroads  had  a  collective  monopoly,  or
near-monopoly,  in land transport.  This  condition has disappeared long ago,  if indeed it ever existed.
Nearly every sphere of rail freight service now faces intense competition. Rival products and rival sources
of supply (including trucks, barges, and alternative rail routes) are likely to impose effective competitive
constraints upon many, if not most, rail activities.  In those activities where there is no evidence that it
holds  a  position of market dominance the railroad should be offered  freedom in pricing.  Still, there
remain  instances in which the competitive  checks of intramodal, intermodal, geographic, and  product
competition are weak or nonexistent.  There is an understandable apprehension that in such cases market
forces may not be relied upon to prevent excessive pricing.  The resulting monopoly power is the basic
justification for regulation of rail rates and earnings, and defines the basic task with which regulation must
grapple.
However, it must be emphasized before discussing the appropriate means to deal with this issue
that, in practice, effective competition can assume a variety of subtle forms.  Therefore, one  must never
proceed in haste to undermine the workings of the market through special intervention.  Railroads do not
6  It should be noted that in many instances  the relevant competition  is not just on the route involved  in the rail
movement,  but also on alternative  routes that offer economic  substitute  services  for the shipper. For example,  a
manufacturer  may find it equally  desirable  to ship output to two very  different  places  for the purposes  of sale, and
will choose the option with the least expensive  transportation.- 7 -
face only the competition of trucks and barges.  For example, oil and  natural gas  shipped by  pipeline
competes with coal shipped by rail and since coal shipment is profitable to the railroads, the competition
of petroleum products limit the price they can charge for carrying coal.  Also, the market served by one
railroad may compete for the coal with a market served by another and this too can keep rates in line.
2.3  The Cost Allocation Problem
The presence of substantial economies of scale and scope in the railroad industry creates a number
of problems for government regulation.  Perhaps the most troubling is the fact that  it is impossible to
allocate, in any nonarbitrary way, a share of fixed and common costs to any  one of a railroad's  many
activities.  There is simply no way to subdivide those costs in a mechanical fashion that is unique and has
any foundation in economic logic.
In practice, regulatory authorities historically have  determined tariffs  based on  so-called  fully
distributed (or allocated) costs.  Under this method regulators do (somehow) allocate shared production
costs to individual services.  Each service is then required to generate revenues which will cover all the
costs associated with that service.  Although it is often argued that there is no sound economic rationale
for fully distributed cost (FDC) pricing, this practice obviously does have economic consequences.
Traditionally, regulatory proceedings have focused on three types of FDC rules.  The first of these
is the  distribution  of  shared  costs  on  the  basis  of a  common  measure  of utilization,  such as  gross
ton-miles.  Under this  FDC  approach, which  is termed the  relative output method,  shared  costs  are
allocated in proportion to the number of units of output of each service.  A second approach sometimes
used is the allocation of shared costs in proportion to the costs that can be directly attributed to the various
services. This attributable cost method has also been traditionally used by many unregulated firms in their
allocation of overhead costs.  A third scheme requires allocation of shared costs in proportion to the gross
revenues generated by each service.  This gross revenue approach, has been frequently used to allocate
overhead costs between freight and passenger services.
In addition to costs that are directly attributable, a service may also be assigned a portion of those
costs which cannot be clearly associated with any one service.  Some administrative costs are shared by
several services.  Railroad track  is used in the transport of many kinds of freight.  Shared costs  may,
therefore, comprise  a  large  portion of total  costs.  Thus,  the method  of allocating  shared costs  may
significantly influence the rate which may be required for any particular service.- 8 -
2.4  No System of Fully Allocated Costs Can Yield Economically Efficient Prices
FDC pricing rules suffer from several disabilities: (i) since fully distributed costs bear no direct
relationship to marginal costs, there is no basis in economic efficiency for FDC pricing; (ii) on grounds
of economic efficiency, it may sometimes be desirable to set a price for some service so that the revenues
it generates do not cover its fully distributed costs; (iii) because the determination of fully distributed costs
is arbitrary, there is no economic basis for concluding that a service is being subsidized by other services
if its revenues are less than  its fully distributed costs; and  (iv) FDC pricing is anticompetitive since it
prevents a supplier from offering a service at a proposed tariff less than an FDC price, particularly if the
proposed tariff exceeds the marginal cost of providing the service.  In addition, there is circular reasoning
behind the FDC practice.  Tariffs which are determined to be "appropriate" at a given time may depend
on the existing levels of output or revenues, and these, in turn, depend on previous tariffs.  Thus, fully
distributed costs may depend on the acceptance of a prior tariff structure.
The most serious defect of fully distributed costs as a basis for rate determination is that they do
not necessarily measure marginal cost responsibility in a causal sense.  They do  not measure by  what
amount costs would be increased if additional quantities of any particular service were taken, or by what
amount  costs  would be reduced  if the service were correspondingly curtailed--they  are costs  that are
averaged  by an arbitrary  method.  Also, being apportionments of historical costs, even  when they do
accurately reflect historical responsibility for the incurrence of these costs among the respective users, they
do not provide a reliable measure of what will happen to costs in the future if particular portions of the
business are expanded or dropped.
Another defect of the fully allocated cost criterion is its complete neglect of any demand data.
Even if it is based on "relative use" as measured in tons or ton-miles, it cannot capture the role of demand,
which economic analysis has shown to be vital in the choice of optimal prices.  Even the best intentioned
of fully allocated cost standards must employ some rigid criterion to allocate the portion of a railroad's
total costs which are not directly attributable to any one of its services in particular.  But no such fixed
allocation criterion can possibly reflect the subtleties, fine structure and changes in patterns of demand for
the railroads'  services that are induced by extemal  developments and clearly call for adjustments  in its
prices.  This, of course,  is true not only of a standard fully allocated cost  approach, but of any  rigid
formula which bases future prices on cost data of the past, because it too can not take account of changes
in demand.
It may  seem paradoxical that fully allocated cost criteria, that are apparently designed to assure
that all costs are covered by revenues, can in fact preclude rail carriers from achieving financial viability.
The reason is that ceilings based on fully allocated costs are set so that unattributable costs are dividedin an arbitrary manner among all types of traffic.  Then, for the these costs to be recovered, all types of
traffic must actually move at the rates that include the arbitrary cost allocations.  But traffic with transport
value that is below average for its tons, ton-miles, or other allocator will not move by rail at those rates.
That is, any service whose demand is insufficient to cover its allocated share of total cost  at the fully
allocated  cost determined  price  will have a  revenue  shortfall which  fully allocated  cost  ceilings will
prevent other services from making up.  Consequently, if the unattributable costs  are substantial, and if
the values of rail services vary substantially, then fully allocated cost rate ceilings will preclude attainment
of adequate revenues.
The effects of fully allocated cost pricing on the efficiency of the utilization of transport resources
are equally pernicious.  In doing their best to earn adequate revenues despite the handicap imposed by
fully allocated cost rate ceilings, rail carriers will be unable to preserve traffic whose value to the shipper
exceeds  its attributable cost, but which  falls sufficiently far below  fully allocated  cost.  True,  in the
absence of fully allocated cost regulation, any such traffic could contribute revenues that exceed the costs
that it causes, and would provide social benefits greater than social costs.  But  with fully allocated cost
rate ceilings, this traffic will reduce the net revenues of the rail carrier and will thus not be compensatory.
The reason is that this traffic will be assigned its portion of unattributable costs on the basis of its tons
and ton-miles or some other arbitrary allocator, thereby reducing the share of those costs allocated to other
traffic with higher value, and consequently reducing the ceiling and the rates on that traffic.
Fully  allocated  cost  rate  ceilings  may also  stifle the  incentives  of railroads  to  innovate  and
compete.  A rail carrier cannot be expected to invest in new facilities, in research and development, and
in  marketing  activities designed  to  elicit  new traffic  if the  financial gains  from  the  new traffic  are
counterbalanced by induced decreases in the ceilings on the rates charged to pre-existing traffic. Similarly,
a rail carrier could not be expected to compete for freight by offering low rates if the necessary markups
were much below the arbitrary allocations of unattributable costs; if it did so, it would never earn adequate
revenues because its gain from the low-rated traffic would be outweighed by the induced decrease in the
ceilings applied to more highly rated traffic.
2.5  Long-Run Marginal Cost and Pricing Efficiency
The indivisibilities, economies of joint production, and high fixed costs which make small numbers
competition in the railroad industry an inevitable consequence also render the traditionai measure of static
deadweight loss incomplete as a welfare indicator.  A regime of marginal cost pricing would eliminate
the deadweight loss.  But marginal cost pricing is a questionable regulatory objective, since the railroads
would incur substantial losses.  If the regulator attempts to force rates to equal marginal costs, overall
revenues will fall short of overall costs.  Without subsidy, reduction of the short-run welfare loss to zero- 10  -
would  cause  the  long-run  deterioration  of  the  industry's  capital  stock.  For  rail  systems  that  are
characterized  by scale economies, rates must generally lie above the costs economically attributable to
individual services if revenues are to cover total costs.
It  should also  be noted that  the use  of long-run marginal cost  to  measure pricing efficiency
frequently leads to misguided rules which could force the railroad into a pattern of behavior that is in
conflict with the dictates of the market.  Indeed, the rigid requirement that each rate always cover the
long-run marginal cost of service is tantamount to a prescription of pricing inefficiency for railroads.
Moreover, such a misguided decision would be likely to impose a heavy penalty upon the public because
it would sometimes deprive the public of a valuable service at a price it is willing to pay--a price which
also  best serves the interests of the company--namely a price that lies between long-run and short-run
marginal cost.
The role of a cost floor as a measure of efficiency is to determine whether the railroad would be
better off without the traffic in question.  There are two basic reasons why it will often be appropriate for
a price to lie below the corresponding long-run marginal cost.  First,  investment decisions which were
entirely rational and appropriate at the time they were made will in many cases subsequently be affected
by unexpected developments.  Such eventualities may cast a shadow over the future of the service which
utilizes  the investment.  A railroad is always better off carrying any and  all traffic  that can cover its
short-run avoidable costs and make some contribution to its fixed and common costs--the supplier earns
more  by  providing  the  service than  by abandoning  it.  The test of efficient  pricing above  short-run
avoidable costs  is whether the railroad is pricing in accordance with market demand.  So long as the
revenue inadequate railroad is charging profit-maximizing rates, it is necessarily pricing efficiently; if the
price maximizes the service's contribution to company profits, clearly no other price conceivably can bring
that service closer to being compensatory in the long run.
The second reason why efficient prices will often fall short of long-run marginal cost affects even
services whose financial viability is absolutely clear.  Whether a railroad will be able in the long-run to
earn revenues that are sufficient to cover the replacement cost of a particular service or a group of services
depends on the level of demand over time.  The rail industry is strongly affected by business fluctuations
in the economy, and demand for individual rail services and groups of services can and does vary widely
over time.  Even services whose financial viability is absolutely clear, will certainly encounter years in
which business is good and other years in which business conditions are poor.  In the less prosperous
years, the firm's earnings will often fall short of long-run marginal cost because market conditions permit
no  alternative.  Of course, the shortfall will then  be made up  during the prosperous periods.  In this
manner then, the firm will in the long-run meet its revenue requirements.  But to insist that prices always
cover long-run marginal costs is effectively to undermine the market pricing process, and, very likely, even- 11  -
the viability of the service--it would clearly distort the intertemporal pattern of usage of the service and
so reduce economic efficiency.  In addition, innovation and improvements in operating efficiency  over
time could potentially reduce costs and enhance contribution.  A rule that assumed assets would not be
replaced simply because current revenues from a particular service were depressed, would remove  any
incentive  or ability  to  respond  to  upswings  in demand  or improvements  in efficiency  which  would
otherwise permit the service to continue.
The long-run marginal cost should never be used mechanically as a rigid minimum cost floor in
the pricing  of a railroad that  is already extant.  At  the same time,  it should be  emphasized  that the
long-run marginal cost cannot serve legitimately to establish the level of efficient pricing above short-run
costs at any point in time.  Instead, efficient rates will always have to be consistent with demand.  This
is true whether or not a railroad has market dominance over a particular service and whether or not it has
achieved adequacy of revenues.  The demand for each service always helps to determine the contribution
that service should make to  the railroad's  overall costs,  and that it should make  if its behavior  is to
comport with the requirements of economic efficiency.
2.6  Economically Efficient Pricing
If there were no need for enterprises to be financially self-supporting, an ideally efficient allocation
of society's  resources would be brought about if the price of each good  or service were equal  to its
marginal cost.  At such prices, consumers elect to purchase all units of goods and services that yield them
benefits  larger than  the costs  of providing  them.  And,  in response to  such prices,  consumers  avoid
purchasing units  that yield  them benefits  smaller than  the costs of providing  them.  As a  result, the
economy misses no opportunity to allocate resources to uses where they yield benefits greater than costs,
and no resources are allocated to uses with benefits lower than costs.
In  industries  without  substantial  fixed  costs,  competition  tends  to  result  in  prices  which
approximate marginal or incremental costs.  However, in the railroad industry, the prevalence of large
fixed  and  common  costs  make  it  impossible  for  the  supply of  rail  services  to  become  financially
self-supporting with marginal cost pricing.  The financial infeasibility of marginal cost pricing rules out
any sensible mechanical or formula-based procedure for regulatory determination of rates.  In particular,
compensatory  rates cannot  be determined by  the  regulator on  the  basis  of cost data  alone  since the
financial viability of any price depends also on the quantity of rail services customers are willing to buy
at that price.  This is true because there is no correlation between demand considerations and any cost
accounting convention.- 12 -
Allocation of fixed and common costs in accord with any non-demand based apportionment rule
will almost invariably produce inconsistencies with the patterns of shipper demands.  Some rates will be
too low, and consequently the railroad will receive less than the optimal contribution from those services.
Other rates will be too high, so that the railroad will either earn less than the optimal contribution Qr no
contribution  at all.  In short, in a multiproduct industry with uncongested fixed and common costs, the
pricing of individual services on the basis of any cost allocation is contrary to the interests of both the
operating entities and the shipping public.  Rational determination of prices must be based on both cost
and demand conditions--demand considerations as well as cost data must enter into decision making, in
order to permit adequacy of revenues and achieve efficiency.
2.7  Demand-Based Differential Pricing
Non-demand based cost apportionment methods do not necessarily reflect the railroad's ability (or
inability) to impose the assigned allocations and cover its costs.  Thus, they frequently "over-assign" or
"under-assign" the carrier's  unattributable costs to particular services.  If a carrier sought to apply FDC
pricing to all its traffic, it would lose that portion of the traffic for which demand could not support the
price  assigned.  In that event, the  remaining shippers would be  saddled with a  larger  portion of the
carrier's  unattributable costs since they would no longer share those costs with the lost traffic.
Ramsey  prices apportion all  unattributable fixed and common costs  of the railroad among  its
services on the basis of their demand characteristics.  Each service is priced at a mark-up over marginal
cost which is inversely related to the elasticity of demand for that service--services whose demands are
highly elastic are assigned prices that are very close to their marginal costs, while services whose demands
are very inelastic are priced well above those costs.  The magnitude of these mark-ups among all services
must be sufficiently high to earn  net revenues that cover fixed and common costs  and, hence, achieve
revenue adequacy.
The logic of this inverse elasticity rule and its implied allocation of unattributable costs is quite
simple.  The elasticity of demand provides a quantitative interpretation of the traditional concept,  value
of service, which has played an important role in public utility pricing.  Consumers who place relatively
high value on a service will have demands for it that are relatively inelastic, and vice-versa.  For if a rise
in price would lead to no significant reduction in quantity demanded (that is, if demand is inelastic), then
the service must be worth at least the higher price to its consumers, that is, the value of the service must
be high.  Conversely, if a rise  in the price of a service would lead consumers  to curtail their demand
substantially (that is, if demand is quite elastic), then the service must be worth little or no more to its
consumers than the original price, so that the value of the service must be low.- 13 -
In view  of this  correspondence  between  value  of  service and  demand  elasticity,  the  inverse
elasticity rule of Ramsey pricing can be restated in terms of a familiar and long-used principle in railroad
pricing.  Services with relatively high values to their consumers  should contribute  relatively large net
revenues to the coverage  of unattributable, fixed and common costs.  Thus, the implicit allocation of
unattributable costs should be based on value of service, rather than any pro rata sharing or other arbitrary
method.  All factors  that influence a rail carrier's  elasticities of demand  are relevant for the  carrier's
Ramsey prices.  These factors may include the value of the commodity shipped, intermodal competition,
intramodal competition, interport competition, and the substitutability of other commodities for the one
shipped at its destination.  Value of service is therefore properly construed as a market concept--it refers
to the  value of the rail  carrier's  service with all demand  factors considered, and  generally cannot  be
evaluated by such measures as the ratio of a commodity's  price to its weight alone.
2.8  Ramsey Pricing--Efficiency and Equity
Under Ramsey pricing, it is the "non-marginal" portion of total costs (i e., the total cost  less the
marginal cost of each service multiplied by the quantity of the service provided) that is apportioned on
the basis of demand.  Equivalently, it is the shortfall between total costs  and the revenues that would
accrue from pricing each service at the level of its marginal cost.  In the presence of economies of scale,
this  shortfall  is positive.  Ramsey prices,  therefore,  deviate  from  marginal costs  only  to  the  extent
necessary to provide adequate revenues--they permit the railroad to achieve the goal of revenue adequacy
with the least sacrifice of economic welfare compared with marginal cost pricing.
Increases  above  marginal cost  in  the  price  of an  elastic  service  causes  much  traffic  to  be
lost--traffic that would generate net benefits because it is valued above the cost it causes.  However, less
traffic is lost when the price of an inelastic service is raised, and the traffic that is curtailed is the least
valued portion.  Consequently, when prices must be elevated above marginal costs to cover unattributable
costs, it is economically efficient to increase prices of inelastic services more than prices of elastic ones.
Such Ramsey prices are, on average, the lowest consistent with finantial  viability.  As long as the price
charged to the price-elastic service exceeds  its incremental cost, then the service is contributing to the
carrier's overhead costs.  Thus, Ramsey pricing prihciples benefit all shippers by establishing a set of rates
which encourage the purchase of more transportation services by more shippers than artificial prices based
on fully distributed cost.  Therefore, by creating a larger traffic base over which unattributable costs can
be apportioned, Ramsey pricing also benefits the so called captive shippers.  The expansion of rail traffic
represents an increase in the flow of commodities to their markets at lower transportation costs.  As a
result, social productivity is enhanced, and more consumers can obtain more of the goods they desire at
lower costs of supply.- 14 -
Since Ramsey prices are based on the relative values of the different services, they may seem to
approximate the solution of the profit-maximizing monopolist, sometimes loosely described as charging
what the market will bear.  However, it is only the firm's necessary costs, including the cost of capital,
that are covered  by  Ramsey prices.  Monopoly prices,  on  the other hand, are controlled  by  no  such
constraint.  Ramsey  prices,  therefore,  are  very  different  both  qualitatively  and  quantitatively  from
monopoly prices.
It should also be emphasized that Ramsey prices are equitable.  First, they are non-discriminatory
in  the  sense  that  services  with  similar  economic  characteristics  have  similar  prices,  whatever  the
commodities shipped, whatever the i  oute and whatever the identity of the shipper.  That is, two different
services with  the same elasticities  of demand  will be priced at  the same percentage  mark-ups  above
marginal costs.  And, two different services with the same marginal costs and demand elasticities will bear
identical Ramsey prices.  Second, while the Ramsey prices of different services are different proportions
of  the  services'  marginal  costs,  the  burdens  from  these  necessary  mark-ups  that  are  borne  by  the
consumers have roughly the same proportion to their respective values of service.
2.9  The Stand-Alone Cost Constraint
Ramsey pricing requires that both the marginal cost and the elasticity of demand be quantified for
every movement in the carrier's  system.  That is all but impossible to do with any degree of accuracy.
Thus, while the Ramsey formula is useful as a theoretical guideline for rate determination, its application
would be administratively difficult  and burdensome--the amount of data  and the analysis required are
overwhelming.  The  Ramsey  pricing rule has  also been  criticized  because  it does  not constrain  the
railroad's pricing of traffic over Avhich  it possesses market dominance and its consequent failure to protect
captive shippers.  In addition, although Ramsey pricing minimizes the static welfare cost of the revenue
adequacy constraint, still output levels are less than they would be if rates were set at marginal costs.  This
results in economic inefficiency because the valuie  of the lost output to the shipper is greater than the value
of the resources saved by reducing output.  Under these conditions, it may be feasible for the parties to
negotiate a contract with incentive clauses, volumc-sensitive pricing, or two-part pricing that will leave
both parties better off than at  .he flat Ramsey price, and consequently be yet more desirable for the public
interest.
The critical issue from the standpoint of efficiency is the criterion used to set the ceiling on rates
where there  is market dominance.  As we have noted above, rate ceilings derived from fully distributed
costs are inimical to the public interest. Economically rational ceilings are obtainable from the stand-alone
cost  (SAC).  The stand-alone cost to any captive shipper or group of shippers who benefit from sharing
joint and common costs, is the cost of serving that shipper or group of shippers alone, as if the shipper- 15 -
or its group were isolated from the railroads' other customers.  A rate calculated by the SAC methodology
represents  the  theoretically  maximum rate  that a  railroad could  levy  on  shippers  without  substantial
diversion of traffic to a hypothetical competing service.  Thus, the SAC criterion serves as a surrogate for
competition  and  leads  to  a  simulated competitive  price.  The competing  service could  be  a  shipper
providing service for itself or a third party competing with the incumbent railroad for the traffic.  In either
case, the SAC represents the minimum cost of a possibly hypothetical alternative to the service provided
by the incumbent railroad.
2.10  Stand-Alone Costs Provide Appropriate Protection Against Excessive Rates
The stand-alone cost test rules out the possibility of abuse of monopoly power by  enforcing a
competitive standard upon railroad rates.  The hallmark of monopoly power is the elevation of the price
of a service above the costs  at which competitors could provide that service.  The stand-alone cost test
makes that impossible and imposes the same ceilings on rates for any traffic over which the railroad is
dominant that the market would impose if it were subject to either active or potential competition.  In the
long run,  in contestable  markets, no  group of shippers would agree to pay  more to a carrier  for their
transportation services than it would cost them to produce these services for themselves, or than it would
cost a competitor to supply it to them.  In the short run, a rail carrier facing either active or potential
effective competition could not obtain revenues from a group of shippers that exceeded their stand-alone
costs, because those shippers could then be profitably served by a competitor charging lower rates.  Thus,
the stand-alone cost test affords shippers the same protection that effective competition would provide.
Clearly, the stand-alone cost is unnecessary and inappropriate where there is competition--the price
set by  competitors  (reflecting  current  costs  of  service)  will set  a  market  ceiling.  If only  potential
competition  exists, the regulatory test is still unnecessary because if the rates charged  by the existing
carrier  exceeded  stand-alone  costs,  that fact  would constitute  an  invitation to entry  by  the  potential
competitors.  However, for any shippers who are truly captive, in that the rail carrier faces no effective
direct, indirect or potential competition for their freight, the stand-alone cost does provide an economically
rational ceiling.
No regulatory ceiling  is needed to act as a surrogate for active or potential competition from a
mode that can operate through the market.  In the presence of such a competing mode market pressures
will enforce the stand-alone  cost ceiling--since no one will be able to sell at any higher price.  There is
yet another consideration which reduces further the likelihood that it will be necessary for regulators to
intervene, except on the rarest occasions, in order to enforce observance of stand-alone cost ceilings upon
rates.  This consideration stems logically from the very concept of stand-alone cost.  For if the rates for
any service exceed those necessary to cover stand-alone cost, that fact by itself constitutes an invitation- 16 -
to entry, that is, it invites the sort of competition which automatically prevents the continuation of such
excessive rates.
The  stand-alone  cost  test  does  not apply,  and  cannot  be  made  to  apply  without  disastrous
consequences, if railroads are denied the freedom to abandon unremunerative facilities or services. Where
that is prevented, a railroad cannot earn adequate revenues if it is constrained by stand-alone cost ceilings
on rates in the potentially remunerative portions of its activities.  For this reason, it is unwise for public
policy to limit the freedom of railroads to curtail unremunerative services without simultaneous provision
of public funds to help defray the costs of those services.
The stand-alone cost ensures the equitable treatment of all of a railroad's shippers.  By requiring
each service or group of services supplied by a rail carrier to contribute revenues less than stand-alone
costs,  the test  assures each  shipper and  each group of  shippers a  share in the benefits  derived  from
simultaneity  of production--from economies  of  scope which  imply  that the total  cost  to  a carrier  of
supplying  many services simultaneously is less than  the sum of the costs  of supplying them  each in
isolation from one another.  Thus, each shipper is guaranteed some benefit from the revenue collected by
the carrier from others.  The stand-alone cost offers assurance to each shipper that it will be better off with
the existing rates than it would be if it had to fend for itself, as would be the case in the long run if the
rail carrier were denied adequate rates.
If the price paid by a shipper is no greater than the stand-alone cost of serving him, then that price
cannot possibly contribute to the cost of any facility from which he derives no benefit.  This must be true
because the stand-alone cost of any facility used by a shipper includes only the (replacement) cost of those
facilities after subtraction of any contributions made by any other railroad customers toward the cost of
these services.  Thus, together, all the customers who share the use of some facilities will provide revenue
contributions which do not exceed the costs of the facilities which they use--there will simply be no excess
that can be used to defray the cost of facilities unused by any member of this group.  The stand-alone cost
test, therefore, precludes cross-subsidies among the railroad's different customer groups.
The  absence  of cross-subsidy  under  the  stand-alone cost  test is an  appropriate and  accepted
criterion of equity  in the treatment of shippers.  Cross-subsidies are properly of public policy concern
because they generally  lead to a misallocation of resources by encouraging inefficient investment.  For
the shippers, they may be of concern because they are perceived as unfair.  Two groups of shippers may
be taken to be treated inequitably if the payments of one of these groups helps to make up for shortfalls
in payments by the other.  Yet, while shippers who pay more for their service may feel that they are being
forced to "cross-subsidize" the other shippers, mere payment of a relatively higher rate is not evidence of
a cross-subsidy where fixed and common costs must be covered.  Rather, a cross-subsidy can only occur- 17 -
in an economic sense where a shipper (or a group of shippers) pays more than the total cost of serving
it alone.  Where no shipper pays more than that amount, differences in their rates simply reflect differing
contributions to the common costs of the system, and not cross-subsidies.
Imposing stand-alone cost as a rate ceiling is a formn  of incentive regulation that avoids introducing
distortionary incentives to the railroad with respect to its operations and costing decisions.  Since the
stand-alone cost is the cost of service by a hypothetical entrant who offers alternatives to the shippers at
issue,  it  is  not  determined  by  any  of  the  costs  actually  incurred  by  the  actual  regulated  railroad. 7
Consequently, under the system of stand-alone cost rate ceilings, a railroad has no incentive to pad or
otherwise increase its expenditures for the purpose of relaxing a regulatory constraint.  Further, since the
ceilings apply only to services over which the  railroad has monopoly power, they do not interfere with
the railroad's  incentives aggressively to pursue additional traffic and other new business opportunities.
Finally,  while  stand-alone  costs  may  be  calculated  on  the basis  of  detailed  engineering  studies  and
judgements,  it is significant to note that they are consistent with the "price-caps" that are becoming so
popular today inasmuch as they can be periodically updated on the basis of net measures of inflation and
changes in productivity.
2.11  Efflcient Pricing Does Not Require Regulatory Control Over the Entire Rate Structure
For  prices  to  be  efficient,  they  must  reflect  implicitly  all  of  the  interdependencies  which
characterize a rail network.  This could be taken to imply that to institute efficient prices for one segment
of a railroad's  activities (which requires regulatory oversight), it would be necessary to simultaneously
regulate the prices  for  all of  the railroad's  services.  Convincing evidence that  such a  conclusion  is
unfounded  is provided by the workings of the free market in unregulated industries.  In such industries,
there  exists no  authority which  coordinates pricing decisions, and  yet compatible  and efficient  prices
emerge, their consistency assured by the forces of competition.  This is precisely why free and unplanned
markets perform so effectively in comparison with those operated by central planners, despite the latter's
alleged ability to take interdependencies into account.
It is for this reason that no regulatory control need be exercised over rates of competitive services.
Here efficient prices are automatically imposed by the market, and regulatory intervention can only impede
the efficiency of the process of rate determination and resource allocation.  Also, relatively little control
need be exercised over rates set by a carrier whose revenues are still short of adequacy.  If total revenue
7  This important  property  of stand-alone  cost is not significantly  undermined  by the practice  of determining  stand-
alone  cost in a fashion  that is informed  by the operations  of the actual  railroad. While  these operations  may provide
guidance  or even a model  for the operations  of the stand-alone  railroad,  the stand-alone  cost need  not reflect  the same
decisions  as those made by the incumbent,  especially  if they lead to unnecessarily  high  costs.- 18 -
is not yet adequate, the best rates in terms of the public interest in the long run are those that maximize
the railroads'  net revenues, i.e., Ramsey prices.  Any railroad with inadequate revenues has powerful
incentives to select such rates.  In such a case, the railroad as a  whole possesses no monopoly power
which offers  it excessive profits, and for  individual services for  which competition is inadequate, the
stand-alone test cost provides the requisite protection to shippers.  Under these conditions, there is no
possibility of unfair competition through cross-subsidy, with noncompetitive rates increased in order to
permit noncompensatory prices in competitive markets.  For where the railroad's  overall revenues are
inadequate, any internally subsidized service must be self-destructive--a drain on the railroad's  already
insufficient revenues.  Thus,  where overall revenues are inadequate, only the stand-alone cost test need
ever be employed in the regulatory oversight of rate setting.
The only case in which more than this minimal regulatory scrutiny may conceivably be required
is that in which a railroad is in a position to earn revenues which are more than adequate.  Here, there is
at least the hypothetical possibility that high prices for one service will be traded off for price reductions
in another.  Consequently, it may be desirable to devote regulatory attention to prices for services sold on
markets from which competition, direct or indirect, actual or potential, is absent.  Yet, even here, there
are incentives for the railroads to select the efficient Ramsey prices.  That is, the interests of the railroads
are still likely to  be served  best by the prices which best  serve the public interest--though it must be
admitted  that the  incentives  for  it to do  so  are apt  to be  somewhat less  powerful than  those  in the
prevailing case of inadequacy of revenues.
There is one principal source of incentives for a carrier capable of earning adequate revenues to
adopt efficient pricing, even though its net revenues are constrained by regulation just to cover its capital
costs  and  no  more.  Such  a  rail  carrier  is  motivated,  perhaps  more  than  other  firms  in  similar
circumstances, to  maintain  its traffic  base and  to  guard against  substantial diversion  of  its traffic  to
suppliers already in operation or to potential competitors. This is because a large portion of a rail carrier's
capital stock is nonfungible, or sunk, so that significant losses of traffic would cause losses of revenue far
greater than the costs that would thereby be saved.  Consequently, a rail carrier with adequate revenues
has a particularly compelling incentive to set rates in a manner that will discourage defections of shippers
and market erosion to competing suppliers of transportation services, both in the short and in the long run.
It may be clear intuitively that among the pricing policies that generate adequate revenues, it is Ramsey
pricing that most effectively discourages such defections and market erosion.  This is simply because at
any one time the Ramsey prices yield shippers the greatest total net benefits possible from prices which
yield adequate revenues,  and  therefore offer shippers the  smallest feasible inducement to  divert their
traffic.- 19  -
In sum, regulation need not take on the overwhelming task of control of all of a railroad's  rates,
simply  to  assure  an  appropriate choice  of prices  in  those circumscribed  arenas requiring  regulatory
attention.  Elsewhere, the  forces of competition and  the self  interest of railroads constitute  powerful
mechanisms which can do the job efficiently and automatically, using the crucial demand information
possessed by the railroads, which is certain to be more complete and more accurate than any demandl  ddid
a regulatory agency can hope to assemble.
2.12  Contestability and the Scope and Structure of Regulation
Contestability is an apt benchmark for the railroad industry, while the familiar perfect competition
benchmark is neither attainable nor desirable for the railroad industry where economies of scale and scope
are  substantial.  In  this  industry, attempts to approximate  perfect competition  may  in  fact be  highly
inefficient and contrary to the public interest. In any case, the theory of contestable markets demonstrates
quite clearly  that neither large size nor fewness of firms necessarily means that markets need function
unsatisfactorily.  Indeed, a variety of market forms far removed from perfect competition may perform
well  for  the  public  interest  so  long as  such  markets  are  structurally contestable.  If  an  industry  is
contestable, then it is best left on its own devices with no government interference, even if it is composed
of a  very small  number of large firms.  Impediments to entry and  exit, not concentration  or scale of
operations alone, are a primary source of interference with the public-interest workings of the invisible
hand.
Contestability  focuses increased attention upon entry barriers and their defining characteristics.
High fixed costs and the consequent economies of scale, for example, have traditionally been considered
as impediments to  entry; contestability analysis shows, however, that they  need  not permit excessive
profits  or prices  or any  of the other  manifestations usually  associated with  market power.  It  is the
presence of sunk costs rather than economies of scale that is of vital importance for market performance.
The  theory of contestability  offers an improved set of guidelines for appropriate  government
intervention in the structure and conduct of firms and industries, that is, of the rules to be followed by the
regulators in those cases in which their intervention is called for.  In addition, it provides economically
sound criteria distinguishing between those cases in which intervention by the public sector is warranted
and those in which it is not.  The theory of contestability is the framework from which was derived the
following precepts for railroad regulation already discussed above:
(i)  Permit a private sector railroad to have freedom of pricing and operations on services that
face effective competition  in the relevant market, whether from other railroads,  other
transportation modes, other origins, other destinations, or other commodities.- 20 -
(ii)  Permit a railroad to set prices that are responsive to differences in demands, as well as to
differences in marginal costs, and further to enter into voluntary contracts with shippers
that  have  individualized  terms,  conditions,  commitments  and/or  compensation
mechanisms.
(iii)  Constrain the prices that a railroad sets to "captive shippers," over whom the railroad has
monopoly power, by the stand-alone costs of the shipper's  service (or by a comparison
of revenues and stand-alone costs associated with any larger group of shippers'  services),
and by the stipulation that the railroad's prices do not generate earnings that persistently
exceed the railroad's replacement costs, including a competitive return on capital.
In addition, contestability is a fruitful framework for analysis of issues pertaining to the vertical
structure  of an industry.  For one  thing, in a  perfectly contestable  market, survival against  potential
competition requires that a firm undertake efficient vertical relationships and structure itself efficiently
along vertical as well as horizontal and conglomerate dimensions.  For another thing, contestability theory
suggests consideration of the idea of separating firms vertically in order to segregate portions that need
regulation from those that do not because of their degrees of competition or contestability. 8
This idea emerges from the application of contestability theory to regulatory policy where sunk
costs are not pervasive in an industry, but rather are centered in a particular sector of its operations, such
as the track, way and structures in railroading.  By isolating the activities with which the heavy sunk costs
are associated, their need for regulation can be quarantined.  By placing relations with the remainder of
the industry at arm's length, to the extent that is permitted by economies of scope, it may be possible to
leave the operations of the bulk of the industry safely to the free market, drawing a regulatory net over
only the segment of the activities of the industry that are inextricably associated with heavy sunk costs.
Thus, contestability  suggests a flexible case-by-case regulatory approach, whereby activities subject to
effective competitive pressures from the active or potential supply of substitute services and markets in
which efficient  technology does not require significant sunk costs are freed from traditional regulatory
constraints and are permitted open entry and more flexible pricing.
2.13  The Vertical Structure of the Railroad Industry
The historical model of railway operations is the monolithic organization, whereby a single entity
controls all facilities, operating and administrative functions, and determines what services to provide to
significantly captive markets.  The conditions that generated this model no longer exist in most countries,
and  governments  have had  to consider fundamental restructuring of the  railway entity  itself, and  the
See Bailey  (1981) for the first expression  of this idea.- 21 -
relationship  between  the railway  and  the State.  The objectives for  such restructuring  have  properly
included injection of more innovative and efficient management, reduction of railway deficits and burdens
of public subsidies, increased competition with other transport modes, and  more responsiveness  to the
needs of emergent capitalist enterprises.  Five generic options can be identified for the vertical structuring
of railways, addressing the set of relationships between the railway entity and other transportation entities
(both  rail and  otherwise), the  markets  served and  the functions  performed.  These  functions  include
ownership; improvement and maintenance of the fixed facilities; control of operations such as dispatching
and freight classification; train movement; equipment provision and maintenance; marketing; and financial
control and accountability.
3.  THE  GENERIC  OPTIONS  FOR  VERTICAL  RAILWAY  STRUCTURING 9
Option  1:  The  Monolithic  Railway.  The  frequent  status quo  is  the  traditional  monolithic
approach, under which the railway  is an integrated entity owning and operating its own facilities  and
vehicles.  Typically,  the  monolithic entity lacks financial incentives and desegregated  information  on
profitability,  is (at  best) production-oriented, is unresponsive to  market demands for  services, and  is
hierarchical (if not bloated) in organizational architecture.
Option 2: Lines  of Business  Organization.  Railway entities may be reorganized and accorded
financial responsibility for lines of business to foster comprehensive business planning, market-sensitive
and cost-sensitive decisions, and greater responsiveness to demand for various services.  British Rail, for
example, has divided itself into five lines of business that are financially accountable to top management
and that "purchase" service by contract from an operating department that is organized along a matrix of
regional and functional lines.  By so doing, British Rail hopes to give commercial sectors a profitability
objective, and to give noncommercial lines of business incentives to reduce their losses.
Option 3: Competitive Access.  Competing railway companies would have exclusive control over
some trackage, but would also have (and give) the right of competitive access over the trackage of (to)
other companies.  Some forms of competitive access include joint terminal agreements and/or conferrals
of trackage rights, whereby one railway obtains the right to use freight handling facilities and/or the line
haul tracks of another railway at a particular location or along a particular route.  A further characteristic
of this option would be arrangements for interlining traffic that is handed off between distinct railroad
entities, in their preference sometimes to utilization of trackage rights.  In the U.S., railroads do a great
deal of interlining, under terms that are largely unregulated, perform reciprocal switching under terms that
9  For an illuminating analysis of the options for restructuring railroads see Moyer and Thompson
(1992).- 22 -
are subject to regulation, and exercise trackage rights that are sometimes freely negotiated and sometimes
result from regulatory mandates (that were mostly put into place in the context of settlements of disputes
over rail mergers).
Option 4: The  "Wholesaler".  Under this option, the railway entity could own and operate the
fixed facility and perform all operations on behalf of marketing entities which would be the "retailers".
This would mean that the railway itself would only haul trains, but would do no marketing to shippers.
In Australia, for example, freight forwarders function as retailers using the state railways'  "wholesale"
services.  These forwarders provide multimodal transport, and conduct a deregulated trucking business.
They  control their own  rail  terminal and yard operations  and negotiate on  the  open market with the
railways to charter unit trains with agreed-upon service specifications.  This permits competition among
efficient intermodal "retailers" to flourish, despite a state or private monopoly on railway ownership.
Option 5:  The  "Toll Rail"  Enterprise.  Under this option, the entire  fixed facility, except for
exclusive facilities, would be the property and responsibility of one owner.  There could be one or more
authorized user(s), which would pay tolls for use of the facility.  This approach differs from "competitive
access" in the following respects:  under the "toll rail" approach, separate entities provide the fixed facility
and conduct  operations, whereas under "competitive access", more than one entity operates in a given
market over a particular fixed facility.  Since 1988, Sweden has implemented a  separation of fixed facility
from operating functions.  The U.K. has recently moved in this direction by establishing a separate entity
to hold and manage the rail system's  assets associated with the track and road bed.  And the European
Union  has articulated  the  policy principle that  its  members move in  the direction of  separating  rail
operations from the fixed facilities.
3.1  Analysis of Monolithic  Railway  Option
The monolithic railway option is largely a strawman from today's perspective--i.e. no one would
deliberately choose it for the public interest.  Nevertheless, it is an option that has in fact been chosen all
too often, either for private interests in monopoly control, or more often, for the political benefits that
could be collected and disbursed through a state-owned monolithic railway. It is predictable that a state-
owned railway enterprise would fail to be beneficially responsive to the needs of shippers, and would
instead be  politically  responsive,  at  the  expense of  efficiency  of  operations  and  of  stimulus to  the
economy. 10 It is equally predictable that a privately owned railway that were exposed to excessively
controlling and economically arbitrary regulation would also be without incentives for efficiency and for
market responsiveness.  Either way, financial deficits would be a natural consequence, as the railway entity
"'  See Willig (1994).- 23 -
failed to succeed in attracting traffic from alternative modes and geography, as it expended inefficiently
on costs, and as it allowed its facilities to suffer from deferred maintenance and replacement.- 24  -
3.2  The Need for Restructuring
There is no doubt but that sustained economic growth and prosperity require transportation that
is responsive to shipper needs and demands, as well as to marketplace opportunities for innovation.  It is
clear today,  too, that  a railroad organized and controlled  according to  the monolithic  model must be
restructured in order to contribute best to the economy and to avoid being a  significant impediment to
growth and prosperity.
One key element of restructuring is to develop internal organization of rail entities that provide
managerial  incentives, information, and  decision-making  decentralization  that conduce  to efficiency,
market responsiveness,  and fiscal responsibility.  Thus, Option  2 is certainly crucial for  restructuring,
whatever else is also entailed.  It should be recognized that an internally restructured railroad enterprise
may show lower technical operating efficiency by some traditional measures (e.g., coach-kilometers per
locomotive-kilometer), but may achieve greater responsiveness of each service to customers'  needs and
willingness to pay.  Economic productivity and the customer's  interests are best promoted by  minimum
total logistics costs, not just  the lowest railway rates accompanied by minimum service quality.
Another  key element of restructuring is to unleash market forces of competition, to the fullest
extent that is consistent with opportunities and other elements of efficiency.  It is difficult to predict what
are efficient  and  market  responsive  vertical relationships and combinations  of logistical roles  among
various rail entities,  truckers, barge operators, port  operators, warehouses, forwarders, etc.  The  U.S.
experience confirms what theory predicts: decentralized market-oriented decision-making that is freed from
excessive regulatory control and that is energized by market incentives is the surest means of finding and
implementing efficient and innovative solutions to problems posed by transportation needs."
Options 3, 4, and 5, as defined above, are approaches to restructuring that have the potential for
bringing more  competition  and  more market  decision-making into the  domain  of  railroading and  its
vertical relations.  Which of these options is the best choice  is a complex  policy decision with many
important dimensions to consider.  Below we offer analyses of the options that may help to clarify some
of the important considerations.
3.3  Analysis of Structural Separation -- Options 4 and 5
The options that separate ownership of facilities from other rail functions such as train operations
and  marketing have generated much attention of late, and deserve serious analysis.  These options have
"  For example,  see Willig and Baumol,  op. cit.- 25 -
considerable  appeal because they seem to mitigate the difficult problems blocking comprehensive  rail
deregulation that are associated with the roadbed costs that are largely sunk. Fixed costs are large because
of the infrastructure (track, stations, etc.) that must be provided before any trains can run on  a route.
Duplication of infrastructure would generally be inefficient, and natural monopoly cost conditions therefore
characterize physical network provision.  These fixed infrastructure costs  are largely sunk  because the
assets are of minimal value for other purposes.  For example, embankments and cuttings, the rail formation
and the platforms are fixed in situ--they are sunk, committed irreversibly to a specified market.  The sunk
nature of infrastructure costs creates significant entry barriers, especially where there are natural monopoly
conditions as well.
The cost conditions relating to the operation of services on  the physical network, on the other
hand, may be more consistent with active and potential competition.  To operate a service it is necessary
(at least) to have trains, staff, support, and rights of way.  Although there are inevitably some sunk costs
in hiring staff and buying or leasing rolling stock, they are small in relation to the massive sunk costs of
establishing network infrastructure.  Locomotives and freight cars constitute capital on wheels, and most
of their cost might be easily and quickly recovered by rolling them to other markets.
Thus, it is possible that if ownership of track and trains were separated, with the track assets held
by the govemment, by a consortium of the operators, or by a regulated private entity, then there could be
vigorous active and potential competition over railway services provided by operators with equal access
to the utilization of the roadbed. Consequently, these operators need not be subject to regulation, and they
would have all the powerful incentives that accompany competition to be efficient and responsive to the
needs of shippers and a growing entrepreneurial economy.
However, there are several links in this chain of policy reasoning that  may be inapplicable or
wrong in a given set of realistic circumstances.
(i)  The provision of many innovative and market-responsive rail services may require specific
investment  in infrastructure,  such as maintenance or  upgrading of  way and  structure
facilities, construction of loading and transhipment facilities and building spurs of track
to  reach a  shipper's  location.  It may  be difficult and  inefficient for any  operator  (or
retailer) to  coordinate, as necessary, with the  infrastructure monopoly (or  wholesaler)
entity,  especially  if  their  incentives  with  respect to  investment behavior  are  not  in
harmony.  The investment incentives of the infrastructure monopolist (or wholesaler) will,
of course, depend critically on whether it is a state owned entity, or, if it is in the private
sector, on the character of its regulation.- 26 -
(ii)  Efficient, safe, and delay-minimizing utilization of track and yard facilities by trains, cars,
and shipments requires close coordination in accordance with priorities that are driven by
considerations  of  both operations  and  shipper  sensitivities.  Competing  operators  (or
retailers)  will  compete  vigorously  and  acrimoniously  over  scarce  or  congested
infrastructure facilities (or wholesaler services), and constantly sorting out their claims will
be important for the overall efficient and responsive operation of the rail system.  This
would be difficult for an unintegrated system with a monopoly infrastructure entity, but
it seems virtually impossible to accomplish efficiently under conditions of niles against
discrimination  and  infrastructure (or  wholesale  service)  pricing  that  is  either  tightly
regulated and/or, for a state enterprise, politicized.
(iii)  It  is plausible  that the freight  hauling operations  on  all  or part  of the rail  system  in
question comprise a natural monopoly, even disintegrated from the infrastructure.  The
economies  of scale and scope that arise from running long trains, from blocking many
different  shippers'  freight in classification yards, and from efficient  utilization of yard
facilities, crew, and  rolling stock, all  are associated with operations,  rather than  with
infrastructure.  Consequently, a separated operations firm may be a monopoly, and it may
have considerable market power unless potential competition is a powerful force.
(iv)  For  potential  competition  to  be  powerful,  an  entering  operator  must  perceive  that
significant sunk investments in rolling stock and in specialized facilities can be avoided.
Locomotives and freight cars may indeed be an example of "capital on wheels" so long
as they can be transported to alternative points of gainful utilization without substantial
costs.  While  this  is  likely to  be the  case  for  services  provided  in the  middle  of  a
landmass with a rich rail network ready to accommodate the cars, it may not be the case
for more specialized cars or for a more isolated market.  Also, the entering operator may
not  have  yard,  loading, car  maintenance, or  spur  facilities  available  unless  new  and
significant sunk investments are made.  For these to be available on equal terms with the
incumbent operator, it must be the case that the infrastructure entity made the  needed
investment as part of its role in the system.  But the more of the entrepreneurship and
risk-taking  investment that  must be accomplished  by  the infrastructure entity  (or  the
wholesaler, under that option), the less it is that is gained by the separation, since the
infrastructure (or wholesaler) entity is either a state-owned or a tightly-regulated private
sector monopoly.
(v)  Efficient pricing to cover replacement costs is made more difficult by separation.  Where
economies of scale are important, efficient pricing to cover replacement costs requires that
shipments of different commodities on different origin-destination routes bear prices with
different relationships to marginal costs.  If it is the case that the operator (or retailer)
firms can readily evade price discrimination on the part of the infrastructure entity (or- 27 -
wholesaler), so that different prices cannot be collected by  the infrastructure entity (or
wholesaler)  for  facility  utilization  (or  for  wholesale  service  utilization)  by  different
shippers of different commodities, then it will be difficult if not impossible for the costs
of  the  infrastructure to be  defrayed by  Ramsey prices.  At  the  extreme,  a  regulated
infrastructure (or wholesaler) entity charging competitive operators (or retailers) an equal
price  for each ton or each ton-mile of freight that  utilizes each of its  facilities  is, in
essence, recreating a system where prices are set according to fully allocated costs.  As
discussed above, such pricing can be a prescription for inefficiency and financial disaster.
Thus, it is clear that separation of operations from infrastructure in a railroad system is no panacea
for regulatory problems.  Instead, as a policy direction, it must be compared with the leading alternative.
3.4  Analysis of the Competitive Access Option
This option is most clearly distinguished from the separation option just discussed by the allowing
of integrated operations by the rail entity.  It is superficially easy, albeit mistaken, to identify an integrated
carrier with the case of the monolithic carrier, because it is tempting to jump to the conclusion that an
integrated carrier would make it very difficult for other entities to participate in its business.  This option
contemplates a requirement that the integrated carrier make its facilities available to other entities on a
"fair and equal basis."  However, if the integrated carrier has strong incentives to keep other entities out,
it is unclear how effective such "equal access" mandates are likely to be.  The rail industry in the U.S.,
like other regulated industries in the U.S. as well (e.g. gas pipelines, telecommunications, and electric
power), has seen many disputes with claims of "unfair" and  "unreasonable" exclusion from a carrier's
facilities, despite rules of "equal access."
Thus, it is key to an assessment of this option to analyze the incentives of the integrated carrier
to accommodate  others  wishing  to participate, and  able to  participate efficiently,  in the  provision of
service.
It is clear that if the integrated carrier is regulated in a fashion that permits  higher prices to be
charged to captive shippers if the carrier does more of the business, than the carrier would have incentives
to exclude other participants.'2 Likewise, if the integrated carrier is constrained by regulation in the
amount it can earn from the portion of service it provides, when it does cooperate with another entity, then
it has incentives to undermine or avoid efficient cooperation in order to enlarge the portion of service it
2  One example of this effect arises under rate-base  rate of return regulation,  as was understood  by Averch and
Johnson in their seminal  paper.- 28 -
provides. 13 In addition, the integrated carrier would be motivated to exclude an efficient participant  if
by so doing the carrier would weaken, in a predatory manner, the competitive impact of that entity in
another market. Under classic rate-of-return regulation, or under a system of regulated "divisions" which
specifies what an integrated carrier can earn  from a cooperative movement, both features  of U.S. rail
regulation at one time, an integrated carrier does have incentives to undermine efficient cooperation.
In sharp contrast, under the regulatory system that has been described above as well-serving the
public  interest, an  integrated  carrier  would generally  have a  real  profit  motive to cooperate  with an
efficient participant in its business.  Here, it is not "divisions" that are specified by regulation, even on
service provided to a captive shipper.  Instead, the described stand-alone cost rate ceiling applies to the
price charged to the shipper, and cooperation with an efficient entity enlarges the pot of returns available
from  the  service,  enabling  more  money  rather  than  less  to  be  earned  by  the  integrated  carrier.
Consequently, except  for  the  rare possibility  of predation, an  integrated carrier  would  have ordinary
business incentives to find and to cooperate with efficient participants in its business, and to negotiate with
them terms that would be mutually beneficial.  This is just a railroad version of business "make-or-buy"
decisions  in other industries.
Despite the prevalence ot efficient incentives on the part of integrated carriers under the form of
regulation described here, it is useftil and wise to augment the system Af  regulation with a fallback set of
standards  to  apply  should  disputes  about  predation  through  competitive  access  arise.  In short,  an
integrated  carrier  that  possesses a  "bottleneck," i.e. a  facility  without which  the  complainant  cannot
reasonably offer its services to the shipper, should not exclude the complainant by refusing an agreement
that would be fully compensatory of all its costs, inzluding opportunity costs." 4 For example, if another
carrier, or an operator, sought to participate in a freight movement that represented new business for the
integrated carrier, then it is to be expected that the latter would negotiate in good faith and not exclude
the other entity if an agreement could  be found that would at least cover the incremental costs  of the
integrated carrier.  If another carrier sought to handle some freight part of the way that the integrated
carrier would otherwise handle itself, then it is to be expected that the integrated carrier would accept an
agreement that earned it a larger net contribution of revenues above incremental costs than it would earn
if it handled the freight without the other participant.  Here, the contribution that the integrated carrier
would earn on its own is part of the opportunity costs it faces from cooperating with the other participant.
These same priniciples apply to interlining, trackage rights, car hire, or any other form of cooperation or
participation through the employment of a bottleneck.
'"  For a more complete  discussion  of these cases, see Ordover,  Sykes, and Willig (1985).
4  This standard was first developed  in Ordover  and Willig (1981).- 29 -
"Efficient component pricing," or "parity pricing," is the name that has been given to the principle
that an integrated carrier  should offer the services of its  bottleneck at a  price  that yields it the  same
contribution that it would earn from performing the end-user's service itself." 5 Behavior consistent with
this pricing of bottleneck services, or more generally with the anti-predation rule just  articulated, leads to
efficient vertical relations, and is thereby consistent with non-predatory incentives under  the regulatory
system we have described.  Such pricing of bottleneck facilities does not place additional competitive
pressure  on  pricing  to  shippers, since it is  based  on  the contribution  that could  be  earned from  the
shipper's  service  at  the  extant  shipper's  price.  However,  it  does  generate  incentives  for  efficient
combinations of transport services to make it to the market, it does provide quality and cost competition
among potential and actual participants for the role of being part of the efficient combination, and it does
help to assure that those with efficient innovations in logistics or in marketing of transport services will
be able to work with carriers to implement their ideas.
3.5  Comparing  Separation  with Competitive  Access
The primary  virtue  of separation as a policy  option is that it may  permit  active or potential
competition to reign among rail operators or retailers--with corresponding assurance of efficient selection
among them for  provision of their services at efficient prices.  At best, separation will accomplish this
end,  but  leave  unresolved  the  difficulties  with  regulation  of  the  provision  of  the  services  of  the
infrastructure, or bottleneck, assets of the railroad network.  Prices charged to shippers will be at least the
sum of the competitive prices for the services of the operators (or retailers) and the regulated prices for
the services of the infrastructure entity (or wholesaler).  They are unlikely to be fully Ramsey efficient
prices for the coverage of replacement costs, because of difficulties of reflecting shippers' differences in
demands in the prices charged for infrastructure services. At the same time, separation may create serious
coordination problems, loss of economies of scope, and otherwise unnecessary  transactions costs.  In
addition, rail operators may not face effective active and potential competition, undermining the potential
for realizing the primary benefit of the option.
In comparison, the competitive access option could also be fraught with problems, when incentives
of bottleneck holders are adverse to efficiency and competition.  A variety of solutions to competitive
access  problems  have  arisen  in  industries  seeking  to  replace  regulation  with competition.  Typical
examples include: mandatory interconnections with competitors and line-of-business restrictions in the
telecommunications industry; "unbundling" of the transportation and energy components of price in natural
gas markets; and equal access to marketing channels (e.g., computer reservations systems) in the airline
industry.  In designing rules that govern vertical relationships among competitors  formerly subject to
15  See Baumol  and Sidak (1994).- 30 -
economic controls, regulators need to address a common basic problem--how to assure that pricing and
terms  of  access  by  "nonintegrated  competitors"  to  the  restricted  portions  of  the  network  will  be
implemented so  that  competition on  the  merits will work to  assure that  the efficient  alternatives  do
successfully participate in the provision of end-users' services. The compensation for and terms of access
should not distort the process  by  which prices are adapted to consuiner preferences and demands for
transportation service.  Prices should be sufficiently high to be compensatory to the "landlord" railroad,
yet  not so  high  as to  preclude  efficient  operations  by  the  "tenant" railroad.  Where  incentives  are
significantly  adverse to these goals,  experience teaches that rules  are too easily evaded,  and  disputes
seemingly never-ending.
It is thus fortunate that under rail regulation that focuses on the levels of rates charged to shippers,
rather than on other prices, such as those charged for access to bottleneck services, incentives are generally
for the promotion  of efficient vertical relationships.  As a result, if  integration is permitted under  this
system of price regulation, then the outcomes are predictably consistent with efficient participation by the
integrated carrier and with other nonintegrated carriers as well, on terms that permit compensatory support
for  the efficient participants.  Further, prices to  shippers can be selected in accordance  with Ramsey
efficiency, even as they are constrained by regulation where the carrier has monopoly power.  Moreover,
unlike the virtues of separation, the efficiency of the outcomes of competitive access  does not depend on
the absence of economies of scope, on the absence of coordination problems without integration, and on
the competitiveness or contestability of rail operations.
On the other hand, separation of track assets from operations is likely to be a particularly attractive
option where a dense and extensive rail network permits many operators to function, and to provide both
active and potential competition to each other.  Another favorable factor is a mature and well-developed
set of fixed facilities, so that there is relatively little extent to the domain of new infrastructure investments
where incentive problems are more likely to arise.  Where this factor does not apply, it will be important
for regulation of the infrastructure entity to permit it to enter into medium or long term contracts with
shippers or with operators that themselves have contracts with shippers, so that the risks and rewards from
investments  can  be  efficiently  shared  by  shippers,  operators,  and  the  infrastructure  entity.  The
impediments to Ramsey pricing that separation might cause would be rendered insignificant to the extent
that the infrastructure entity does not attempt to recover its sunk capital costs from "tolls" levied on traffic.
If the infrastructure entity is expected to seek recovery of its replacement costs, then it should be permitted
and even encouraged to implement forms of price discrimination that help to bring shippers' prices in line
with principles of  Ramsey efficiency.  Finally, there  may  well be circumstances  where  a monolithic
railway system cannot be converted to one  with functioning competitive  access because  of imbedded
business culture and entrenched management.  Here, the act of separation is so revolutionary that it may
unsettle the business culture in a productive fashion, arnd  force reassignments of management that permit- 31 -
implementation  of  the  necessary  internal  reorganizations  of  responsibilities,  roles,  incentives,  and
information flows.
4.  CONCLUDING  REMARKS
We  have  outlined a  set of principles that together  add up  to  a program  for restructuring  the
relationships between government and railroad entities.  These principles point towards a great deal of
reliance  on  market forces to  shape prices and logistics of services.  At  the same time, the principles
include economically appropriate protections for any captive shippers and for any carriers  that may  be
excluded or foreclosed from participation for anticompetitive reasons.  On the subject of restructuring, we
have  pointed  out that  internal managerial  reforms are  necessary, as are  policies that address  railway
vertical relationships.  The two leading candidates, separation of track from operations in different business
entities, and incentives and failback rules for competitive access, were compared on several dimensions,
and their relative levels of appeal were found to depend on a variety of characteristics of the business
environment.
It can be expected that restructuring along the lines we have suggested here, providing a greater
emphasis on marketing effectiveness, will result in a more profitable railway that can better hope to cover
its costs, in the case of commercial services.  Needed noncommercial services should be carried out on
the  basis  of an  explicit  agreement  between  the  railway  and  government  that  views  public  service
obligations as a business relationship between a customer (government) and the contract supplier (railway).
This would  help  to ensure that  noncommercial services are more effective in fulfilling public  policy
objectives,  while  eliminating  an  insuperable drain  on  revenues that  would  condemn  the  railroad  to
insufficient investment, and eliminating cross-subsidies that make it difficult for the railroad to maintain
its efficient competitiveness against other modes.- 32 -
Appendix A.  TECHNOLOGY AND THE STRUCTURE  OF  RAILROAD COSTS
The output of the rail industry is multidimensional by its very nature.  Railroad firms produce
different types of transportation services for different users at different origins and destinations at different
times and at different levels of quality.  Consequently, the mix of output and shipment characteristics can
have a major impact upon the costs of any given firm. For example, railroads specializing in coal traffic
have  very different cost  characteristics than those specializing in movements of general manufactured
commodities.
The most striking feature of the railroads' cost structure is the high incidence of costs that cannot
properly be attributed to any particular service at a particular point in time.  That is, a significant portion
of costs are incurred  on behalf of several activitics and do  not vary with the amount provided of the
service in question.  These unattributable expenditures  reflect both joint and common costs.  "Common
costs" are costs shared by two or more services in variable proportion.  For example, a terminal represents
a common cost; it is used by different services in varying proportions. More generally, the outlay on track
and  way and  structures  between  points A  and  B is a  common cost  for  all  movements  of whatever
commodities  are shipped between A and B ov ,r that route.  "Joint costs", on  the other hand, are costs
shared by two  (or  more) services in fixed proportions.  A  backhaul movement is the classic railroad
example.
The structure of railroad costs  has important  implications for the competitive  structure of rail
markets.  It is sometimes mistakenly inferred from statistical evidence of constant returns to firm size that
a competitive equilibrium with marginal cost prices covering total costs would be sustainable in the rail
industry.  Such reasoning neglects the critical fact that indivisibilities in rail technology make increasing
returns to scale in total costs endt.mic, and small numbers competition inevitable.  A rail link between two
points requires lumpy investment in way and structures with associated highly significant economies of
traffic density--unit costs fall with output, letting all factors of production vary on a given route or route
structure.
A.1  Fixed and Variable Costs
A  fixed cost  is  one  that  is necessary  to  provide a  service or group  of services,  but  whose
magnitude does not vary with changes in the quantity of a service that is planned to be or that is in fact
provided.  For example, if a railroad is to run bet%4een  A and B, there is a minimum outlay on track and
roadbed that must be incurred, even if the trains run virtually empty.  The service can be discontinued
altogether; but even in the longest of long runs, it; roadbed cost canriot be reduced to a negligible  level
if the amount of the service is to be positive.  Also, a loading facility may be necessary to transport coal- 33 -
efficiently between points  A and B, but its cost may be unchanged if the amount of coal transported is
doubled or halved.  Common costs are often fixed (e.g., the basic portion of the outlays on track and way
and structures between A and B may be both fixed and common costs).
Fixed  and  common  costs  are  quite  different  from  variable  costs.  Economists  employ  two
fundamental cost concepts in defining variable costs--marginal cost and incremental cost.
The marginal cost of a service is the additional cost that would be incurred in order to supply an
additional unit, or the saving in total cost that would be made possible by  supplying one less unit.  As
such, the marginal cost of a rail service is the per-unit opportunity cost to the rail carrier of the level of
a service's  volume.  The term "opportunity cost" refers to the value a resource can contribute if it is used
in some alternative occupation instead of the one to which it is currently assigned by the railroad.  Thus,
marginal cost  is similar  in meaning to  unit incremental cost and  to the  true economic  variable  cost.
However, the definition of marginal cost makes it clear that it should include the traffic-sensitive  costs
of capital facilities  that are fungible and economically attributable to the service, as well as the more
obvious cost components such as fuel, labor, and traffic-sensitive maintenance and replacement costs.
For example, locomotives and other rolling stock employed for some period of time to provide
a given rail service have a  significant opportunity cost for a  rail carrier.  If not utilized  to supply the
service in question,  they could  instead be gainfully utilized elsewhere in the rail network, by  the rail
carrier at issue, or by some other carrier.  Assuming that at least some carriers do not have excess supplies
of the equipment in question, or their functional equivalents, a decrease in the quantity supplied of the
service would release equipment that could decrease or delay the need of some carrier to lease or purchase
stock for replacement or expansion.  Consequently, it follows that the opportunity cost of the rolling stock
is its replacement cost, at the current cost of capital.  Thus, the marginal cost of a given service includes
the costs  of fungible capital goods that are utilized, such as locomotives and other rolling stock, at the
current cost  of capital  for the  period of time during which  they  were so  employed.  Of  course, the
marginal cost of a service also includes the wear-and-tear on capital assets and the required maintenance
expenses that  the supply of the service causes. 16 However, the costs  of facilities that  are fixed or
common are not included in the service's  marginal costs.
The incremental cost of a service is the cost per unit of service necessary to provide the entire
service, or the cost avoided by not providing the service, given all the other services supplied.  The term
1h  For example,  it is clear that the passage of rail traffic causes  wear and tear on track, ties, and ballast, and that
this in turn shortens  the lives  of the assets. Consequently,  one element  of the marginal  cost  of rail traffic arises  from
the hastening  of the time that the assets  it utilizes  must be replaced--to  wit the present  discounted  value  of the capital
cost of the assets' value, over the time period that their needed  replacements  are advanced.- 34  -
"avoidable cost" is also used to describe the cost per unit of service that could be avoided by not providing
a particular service.
The important conceptual point here is that a railroad's  total costs are composed of some costs
which  vary with the amount of a  particular service provided and others that do  not.  This is obvious
enough, but considerable confusion is often engendered when the additional point is made that in the long
run virtually all fixed and common costs can be varied.  The reason is simply that in the long run virtually
all assets must be renewed or replaced.  At the date when the decision regarding renewal or replacement
of the fixed factors of production required to supply a service or group of services is under consideration,
the costs involved are incremental to that service or group of services.  If it were decided no  longer to
provide those services, the costs would not be incurred.
This obviously does not mean that there is no economic distinction between variable costs and
fixed and  common  costs.  What  it does mean  is that the  perspective of the decision  maker  is  very
important.  When a railroad is making decisions regarding the incremental costs of adding  a particular
service (or the avoidable costs of eliminating a service) given existing capacity, the short-run variable costs
of service will include only the additional costs of production imposed by that service.  Rarely will this
include the full measure of long-run fixed costs.  In contrast, when a railroad is making  the long-term
decision  whether it is in its economic interest to replace a portion of its rail  network (or  to make an
entirely new addition to its network), the "long-run variable costs" of the service or services the railroad
plans to offer will include all the fixed costs which will become sunk (i.e., irreversible for a significant
period of time) once they are incurred.
A.2  Sunk  Costs
Long-run fixed costs are those costs that are not reduced, even in the long run, by decreases in
output so long as production is not discontinued altogether." 7 But they can be eliminated in the long
run by  total cessation of production.  Sunk costs, on the other hand, are costs  that (in some short or
intermediate run) cannot be eliminated, even by total cessation of production.  As such, once committed,
sunk costs are no longer a portion of the opportunity cost of production.
Sunk costs need not be fixed and, even more important, fixed costs need not be sunk.  To operate
with current production  techniques, a railroad requires at least a  locomotive and  one car, the costs  of
which must be included among its fixed costs.  Yet, because they constitute capital on wheels, most of
their cost can easily and quickly be recovered by rolling them to another market, should the railroad's
'7  See Baumol  and Willig (1981), and Baumol,  Panzar,  and Willig (1988).- 35 -
management decide (and be permitted) to close down the line in question.  Thus, little or none of this
portion of fixed cost is sunk, in contradistinction to the roadbed cost, which typically is sunk.  While
bridges, ballast, rails, and ties can also be moved from one route to another, they can be moved only at
considerable expense.
The  distinction between sunk and fixed cost  is not a  mere technological quibble.  It makes a
substantial difference for the design of appropriate public policy if the costs of the firms in an industry
include the one rather than the other.  Sunk costs contribute to entry barriers which, as is well known, can
give rise to monopoly profits, resource misallocation, and inefficiencies.  On the other hand, fixed costs
do  not constitute barriers to entry and do not entail the misallocation problems to which entry barriers
lead.  Fixed costs are not, and do  not raise, entry barriers unless they also happen to be sunk.
A.3  Economies of Scale  and Scope
The issue of whether a firm's total costs will be recovered from prices that are equal to the firm's
marginal costs  of supply is  logically equivalent to the question  of whether the firm's  operations  are
characterized by economies of scale, or, in alternative terminology, increasing returns to scale.
For multiproduct railroad firms, economies of production could exist due to the level of supply
of all the firm's  outputs (economies of scale), as well as due to the breadth of the set of services supplied
(economies of scope).  Economies of scale are exhibited where equiproportionate changes in the levels
of all services provided would require a less than proportionate change in the level of efficient costs.  In
addition to economies deriving from the size or scale of a firm's operations, there is also the possibility
that  cost  savings  may  result  from  simultaneous production  of  several  different  outputs  in  a  single
enterprise, as contrasted with their production in isolation, each by its own specialized firm.  That is, there
may exist economies resulting from the scope of the firm's operations.
There are substantial economies of scale in the provision of some rail services, whether focused
on  particular routes  or types of freight, which result from the  heavy fixed costs  associated  with rail
operations.  To transport even small amounts of freight, a railroad must generally incur the costs of track,
right-of-way, locomotive power, crew, and certain facilities.  These costs do not rise proportionately with
traffic volume.  As more traffic uses a section of a roadway, very few additional fixed costs are incurred,
and the extant costs are spread over more traffic.  A single track line can handle large amounts of traffic
before a full second track must be added or advanced signalling systems installed.  Scheduled trains can
be made longer to accommodate more cars on the same origin-to-destination route without  proportional
increases in the costs of locomotive power and crew.  The more freight that is scheduled to traverse the
same route, the larger can be the preblocked movements, with correspondingly less reclassification yard- 36 -
activities and time needed, and with more opportunities to run efficient through-train service  In short,
additions  to the  levels of rail  services supplied do  not entail proportionate additions  to the  levels of
expenditure  required for  fixed plant,  for  equipment investment,  and for  operating  expenses.  This  is
precisely the hallmark of economies of scale.  Fixed costs, of both the sunk and fungible varieties, per ton
of freight fall as traffic volume increases, and so cost efficiencies may be associated with single carrier
provision of rail services.
Another advantage of firm integration in the rail industry arises from potential economies of length
of haul.  With fixed terminal expenses, longer hauls normally imply lower costs per mile.  In the presence
of such economies, a railroad with an integrated nationwide system will sometimes have a cost advantage
over competitors that make and accept interline shipments to and from other railroads.
Increased firm size may convey cost advantages because of specialization and  massed-reserves
economies.  A large firm may employ a more richly specialized array of accounting, finance, marketing,
engineering,  research,  and  legal  talent  than  a  smaller competitor.  This  may  be  reflected  in  lower
administrative  costs  and/or  higher productivity.  It  can  mass  its  cash  balance  reserves  and  spread
production, market, and financial risks over a larger volume of activity--the diversification of the portfolio
of transportation services offered by a large railroad creates an overall system risk factor that could be
substantially less than the risk associated with investment in just one of those services.  A large railroad
firm with an integrated network may also realize economies in equipment investment.  In general, railroads
attempt to minimize the need for new equipment purchases by using equipment interchangeably throughout
the system.  When cars and locomotives are needed at some shipping point, the railroad can immediately
send them out of the most convenient distribution center.  Operations with assigned equipment require
more switching than those which draw their equipment from common pools.  In addition, the ability to
use  locomotives interchangeably reduces the number of reserve  locomotives needed to protect against
equipment failures, repairs and inspection.  A larger railroad firn  may, therefore, obtain the same degree
of protection at lower cost relative to total capacity carrying costs.
Another pertinent feature of the railroad industry is that there are substantial economies of scope
which result from the common costs of rail operations.  Outlays on rails, ties, rights-of-way, yard facilities,
locomotion, and train crews are among the many common costs of rail operations incurred in carrying a
variety of  types of freight  between a  variety of origins and  destinations.  These shared  costs  confer
economies of scope on carriers offering a multiplicity of transportation services: a carrier that provides
an array of services can do so at a lower total cost than a set of carriers producing each service separately.- 37 -
A.4  Economies of Size vs. Economies of Scale and Density
The overall size of a railroad is likely to be quite independent of the amount of traffic that travels
on any of its routes--that is, a large firm may have short or long hauls and high or low traffic densities
between different points.  There has been a serious confusion between economies of scale, economies of
size, and economies of density, and a concomitant failure to specify clearly which is being measured. 18
Economies of scale are carefully defined to refer to a long-run average cost curve that declines as the
quantity of the firm's output of a given collection of services increases.
Comparing the average costs  of railroads that have different sizes of route  networks does not
provide information directly relevant to economies of scale, because such railroads do not supply different
amounts of a given collection of services.  Instead, they likely offer quite different collections of services
as a result of their different route mileages and architectures.  To emphasize the point that the correct and
relevant measure in railroading is the degree of scale economies that relates to traffic  volume on each
particular route, rather than to the extent of the traffic on an overall and possible growing system, these
economies have come to be termed economies of density.  Thus, the critical determinant in pricing and
(dis)investment policies is whether or not there are economies of density.  It is therefore  important to
assess the extent to which unit costs decline as output increases holding the route system, or miles of rail
line constant.  A small firm with high traffic density could potentially have lower average costs  than a
large firm with low density.
Economies of density are normally attributed to declining average capital costs.  However, the
provision  of rail  service  entails more  than  simply  installed capacity;  it includes  minimal  (and  often
indivisible) amounts of crew, engines, maintenance, etc.  Indeed, recent empirical studies indicate that the
maintenance of way and structure and transportation expense (mainly fuel and crew wages) account for
a significant portion of the estimated economies of density--approximately two-thirds of these economies
are due to variations in unit operating costs per route-mile.
Under significant economies of density, the cost-minimizing market structure for.a given route
might call for a single firm, i.e., the route would be a natural monopoly.  In the absence of any other scale
economies, the national railway system could be made up of a large number of small firms, each with a
local monopoly.  Alternatively, if there were substantial economies  of firm size without economies  of
traffic density, it would be economic to have a number of integrated nationwide railroads that competed
on all their routes.  However, with economies of density, and with economies of scope, and with some
1  See Harris  (1977).- 38 -
economies  of end-to-end  long  hauls,  the cost  effective  structure of  the rail  industry is  likely to  be
characterized by very few firms.
A.5  Empirical Evidence on Scale Economies
There are at least two approaches to measuring cost-scale relationships in the rail industry.  The
first  way is to employ  the expertise of those who have  intimate knowledge of railroad operations  in
ascertaining whether the costly inputs required to supply rail services must be expanded in proportiop to
accommodate expansions  in  the quantities  of services provided.  This  is  known  as  the  engineering
approach.  The second approach is statistical cost analysis--econometrically estimating the relationship
between railroad costs and the levels of rail services provided.  In the railroad industry, there is no conflict
between the conclusions  reached from these two different approaches.  Both indicate quite clearly that
railroad operations are characterized by increasing returns to scale, and that consequently the recovery of
railroad costs requires that prices exceed marginal cost$.
The first approach has been followed by  a long succession of industry observers who provided
a  knowledgeable  overview  of the details  of  how economies  of  scale arise  in  rail operations.  First,
economies are created for the system as a whole by operations which are directly common to all traffic.
Prominent among these are economies in network plannipg and management.  If network management and
control (e.g., billing, payroll, system-wide insurance, and other housekeeping functions) involves a fixed
cost regardless of network size (above a certain threshold), these costs will be spread over a larger user
base  in a  larger  integrated  rail system.  Similar integration economies  arise  in communications  and
dispatching activities, and from increases in work force specialization within the repair facilities of larger
systems.  Finally, large railroads benefit from capital raising and other pecuniary economies (e.g., price
concessions from suppliers). Indeed, this appears to be one of the most persistent advantages of firm size,
with small incremental capital cost savings enjoyed out to very large scales.  However, the capital-raising
economies of scale are also associated with real resource savings.  Negotiating a loan or new stock issue
or obtaining necessary regulatory clearances entails transaction costs, some portions of which are nearly
fixed.  Clearly, the larger the issue is, the lower those costs are per unit of capital raised.
Second, the integration of the railroad system permits  economies which  directly benefit some
traffic and indirectly benefit other system activities.  Most ancillary plant (e.g., storage and marshalling
yards,  sidings,  switches, and  fueling and  repair stations) can  be utilized by  more and  more  shippers
without causing a corresponding increase in the amount of investment required.  A coal shipper might
need a storage and marshalling yard to hold its cars urqtil  a trainload volume is accumulated.  If a mine
produces only 20 carloads a day and holds them until 100 cars are available, a yard that could store and
switch  100 cars would be required,  However, on an independent operation basis, only 20 percent of the- 39 -
yard would be utilized  in the first day, 40  percent in the second, 60 percent on the third, etc.  Yet, a
railroad that connected with more mines might receive 20 cars a day from five mines and send a trainload
every day.  It would still only need the 100-car yard, but would have five times as many cars to share in
the coverage of the investment and operating costs of the yard.
Similarly, a full siding  is necessary if one train a  day will meet one other train coming  in the
opposite direction--but the same size siding would be necessary if four trains were meeting four trains at
the same place.  Crossing protection must be built and maintained in a densely populated area whether
the railroad sends one train a day or three trains a day over the track at the crossing.  The same is true
for switches, fueling stations, and all other fixed plant investment.  Once the plant is installed, a railroad
can utilize it far more heavily with very little additional fixed investment cost.  Also, a train of 40 cars,
needs a crew of the same size as one of 60 cars.  The ability to marshall cars of different shippers into
a larger train also cuts other operating expenses.  The engine power necessary for a longer and heavier
train is not commensurate with the additional cars which have been added.
The statistical or econometric approach to analyzing railroad economies of scale has also had a
long history. This history is rife with academic controversy and with steadily improving research methods.
For example, some econometric studies found no evidence of rail economies of scale because they were
founded on arbitrary allocations of costs between freight and passenger services. Other investigators failed
to distinguish economies  of scale from possible economies stemming from the geographic extent of a
railroad's  operations.  Such studies incorrectly conclude that increasing returns to scale are absent from
a finding that railroads covering more territory do not necessarily enjoy lower costs per ton-mile of freight.
Recent econometric studies in the United States have avoided these pitfalls and warrant several
important conclusions.  First, most of the rail system operates subject to increasing returns to scale and
has  elements of natural  monopoly, whether considered in a  single-product or a  multiproduct  setting.
Second, as Fig. A. I indicates, unit costs decline sharply with density, but at some point between 25 and
40 million annual gross ton-miles per route-mile, depending on the commodity mix, the cost curve flattens
out and a large  part of the traffic  in the system flows over this flat part.  This represents the level of
minimum efficient density, and one can think of this as the capacity of a single track between two points,
the  fundamental  indivisibility  in  the  rail  cost  structure.  Higher  traffic  density  can  be  served  at
approximately constant cost by adding segments of parallel track and signalling devices.  Third, for very
short-haul, terminal-oriented railroads, the long-run cost curve seems to flatten out much sooner (at under
2 million net ton-miles per route-mile).  Fourth, there are considerable economies of longer hauls.
Overall,  these  studies establish  the presence  of substantial economies  of  scale  in the  freight
operations of railroads.  They  indicate that pricing at short- and long-run marginal costs would recover- 40  -
less than 80 percent of total long-run costs.  Also, high density traffic seems to exhaust the economies of
scale experienced at lower densities, but significant diseconomies of scale do not occur as densities grow
larger.  Consequently, since all railroads have relatively low density traffic on many segments, and since
most traffic flows on low density track while it is gathered and distributed, rail services exhibit substantial
economics of scale overall.  As a result, prices set at marginal  costs would leave uncovered a substantial
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Appendix B.  RAIL COSTS,  PROFITABILITY, AND INFRASTRUCTURE CHANGES
Most of the statistical and econometric studies estimating rail costs and production functions suffer
from two fundamental weaknesses.  First, they generally fail to differentiate between way-and-structures
capital, which is a measure of the quantity and quality of the capital utilized in the roadbed, and track,
which in addition to being a proxy for the roadbed capital is also a measure of common carrier obligations
to haul commodities.  Second, they generally fail to take into account the effect upon costs of the route
network and differentiate between high-density, fully utilized track and light-density, underutilized track.'9
Way-and-structures (WS) capital is a measure of the capital utilized in the roadbed and as such
should be treated as a conventional factor of production.  An increase in the fixed factor, WS capital,
should lead to a reduction in other factors and hence reduction in variable costs.  In contrast, track and
low-density track should be treated as technological variables that affect the costs of the railroad firm in
a way that is not necessarily associated with conventional production theory.  An increase in low-density
route-miles or total track represents an increase in common carrier obligations and should therefore be
associated with increases in expenditures on other factors of production.
A ceteris paribus reduction in WS capital will reduce the quality of the existing track and hence
lead to cost increases by requiring increased amounts of variable factors--more money must be spent on
equipment maintenance and train crews as the quality of the roadbed deteriorates and speeds are reduced.
Similarly, a ceteris paribus reduction in track will not only be correlated with reduction in common carrier
obligations and improvements in the quality of the existing track, but also with increases in its utilization.
The first two considerations will tend to reduce costs, while the latter will tend to increase them, making
the impact of reduced track somewhat ambiguous.  Reduction in low-density track, on the other hand, will
reduce common carrier  obligations and their associated costs  and will therefore tend  to generate cost
savings.
B.1  Railroad Costs and Infrastructure Variables
To assess the possible savings that would accrue from policies aimed at changing the railroad
infrastructure, it is important-to quantify the impact of changing the three main infrastructure variables--the
amount of WS capital, general track, and low-density track--upon rail costs.
Ceteris paribus increases in WS capital will raise the amount of capital embodied in each mile of
track and thus lead to reductions in variable costs.  Indeed, econometric estimates (from the United States)
19  See Friedlaender  and Spady (1980).- 42 -
reveal that a 10-percent increase in WS capital leads to over 4-percent decrease in variable costs consisting
of approximately 11-percent savings in equipment usage, a 3-percent decrease in general labor, a 3-percent
decrease in yard and switching labor, a 2-percent decrease in on-train labor, and a 0.6-percent savings in
fuel and materials. 20 These estimates, therefore, seem to indicate that the main effect of an increase in
WS capital is to decrease equipment requirements with somewhat lesser savings in the labor categories.
This confirms the intuition that the savings in variable costs that result from an increase in WS capital
have increased train speeds as their source.
Ceteris paribus reductions in light-density track are correlated with increases in the amount of
capital embodied per mile of track and reductions in the proportion of low-density mileage; both of these
factors  should  be  associated with cost  reductions.  Econometric estimates  indicate  that  a  10-percent
reduction of low-density route-mileage would reduce total variable costs by approximately 3 percent.  This
comes about by reducing yard and switching labor costs by somewhat over 4 percent, reducing general
labor  and  equipment  expenditures by  somewhat  over 3  percent, and  by  reducing fuel  and  materials
expenditures by less than I percent.  Thus the primary savings arising from abandonment of low-density
line are concentrated in transportation and switching categories associated with moving trains over lightly
utilized track.
Finally, ceteris paribus reductions in general track are not only correlated with increases in capital
embodied per mile of track, but are also correlated with increases in the proportion of low-density track.
While the first factor should tend to reduce costs, the second should increase them.  Econometric estimates
reveal that a 10-percent reduction in general track or route-miles only leads to a reduction of total costs
of less than  I percent.  In terms of factor utilization, reductions in general route-miles lead to sizeable
reductions in equipment and materials expenditures, but increases in labor expenditures.  Thus as the same
volume of traffic  is moved over a smaller network, increased expenditures on labor and switching are
required, while savings on fuel and equipment are achieved.
B.2  Low Density Lines and Profitability
Rail costs  are quite sensitive to changes in WS capital and light-density route-miles, but not to
changes in general route-miles.  A change in general track or route-miles without a concomitant change
in  low-density  route-miles  has  a  small  impact  on  variable costs,  but a  significant  effect  on  factor
intensities.  What  distinguishes  the  provision  of  low-density  service from  that  of  general  network
expansion  is the greater labor intensity of the former.  Thus, efforts to adjust amounts of WS capital
2"  See Friedlaender  and Spady, op. cit.- 43  -
through roadbed  maintenance or efforts to abandon light-density lines are likely to have  a rather large
impact on costs, while the abandonment of general track per se will lead to relatively few economies.
Econometric estimates from the United States reveal quite clearly that the low-density lines are
a significant drain on railroad profitability, and constitute a serious impediment to the attainment of static
and dynamic efficiency in the industry.  The avoidable losses recoverable by abandonment appear to be
quite  significant.  In addition,  the  burden of  excess  capacity  seems to  have  a  dynamic  impact  on
efficiency.  The abandonment of low-density lines stimulates the formation of new capital on the high-
density portions of the rail network.  First, since abandonment reduces the need for cross-subsidization,
rates  on  the  high-density  lines  are  permitted to  fall  toward  marginal cost.  The  lower  rates  attract
additional traffic, and thus raise the level of desired capital.  Second, abandonment of low-density lines
lowers the cost of capital to rail firms by improving their long-run profitability and reducing the risk of
bankruptcy.- 44  -
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